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Kurds living under the rule of the
Islamic republic have, however,
succeeded in creating counter-
hegemonic discourses that
challenge the state’s nationalist
identity as well as its cultural,
developmental and security
politics.
Nevertheless, the years of reform
improved the political and cultural
situation in Kurdistan to some
degree by facilitating the formation
of a variety of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and other
civil society groups.
Criticizing and challenging the
state’s industrial and military
projects in Kurdistan and their
degrading e ect on nature are
further aspects of Kurdish
environmentalism.
A Kurdish protestor holds a sign that says, “Kurdistan’s share of development is death,” referring
to the Iranian president’s promises for economic development. Mariwan, Iran, October 6, 2016.
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n July 13, 2020, two young Kurdish men, Diako Rasoulzadeh and Saber Sheikh-Abdollah, were executed by the Iranian government
on fabricated charges of involvement in bombing a military parade in Mahabad in 2010. They were also members of Komala, a
banned Kurdish political party. Amnesty International notes that, “There has been an alarming escalation in use of the death penalty
against protesters, dissidents and members of minority groups in Iran.” The Kurdish region is the most militarized in Iran, a situation
that dates back to the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988). The persecution and alarming number of executions
of political and civil society activists among the Iranian Kurds are repeatedly featured in annual reports by the United Nation’s O ce of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In the OHCHR’s July 2019 report, Javid Rahman, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Iran, con rms that almost half of political prisoners in Iran are Kurdish activists while Kurdish people make
up just ten to 15 percent of Iran’s population.
The Kurds in Iran have been engaged in a century-long
struggle against sovereign authority in Tehran. While
armed insurgency has been one element of Kurdish
politics in Iran—especially in the late 1940s, 1970s and
1980s—the Kurds’ response over the past 40 years to the
state’s authoritarian policies in Kurdistan has also taken
the form of civic activism, especially in the spheres of
publishing, language instruction and environmental
activism.
The Kurds’ central demand is autonomy and the right of
self-determination within the legal and political
framework of a democratic Iran, which has been the
main objective of the Kurdish struggle since the Iranian
revolution. For example, the Kurdish movement,
especially its leading political organization the KDPI,
framed its claim for national rights in terms of
democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan (Demokrasi beray Iran, khodmokhtari beray Kordestan). The state, which represses
Kurdish social and political activity as a threat to Iran’s national security, rejects this call outright.[1] In the absence of legal political
parties in Iran, Kurdish civil society (which refers to associations that are legally recognized by the local, provincial and central
government) has had to innovate new methods of resistance to authoritarian rule, even though the securitized nature of Kurdish-state
relations has made this task extraordinarily challenging.
Kurds living under the rule of the Islamic republic have, however, succeeded in creating
counter-hegemonic discourses that challenge the state’s nationalist identity as well as its
cultural, developmental and security politics. But academic conversations and studies of
Kurdish politics in Iran remain narrowly focused on the activities, and armed insurgencies,
of the mainstream political parties of Iranian Kurdistan: the Kurdistan Democratic Party of
Iran (KDPI), the Society of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan (Komala) and the Free
Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), all of which are considered illegal by the Iranian state.[2] This
limited academic view is peculiarly similar to Tehran’s own framing of Kurdish politics. As a
result, Kurdish civil society’s approach to claiming their social, political and cultural rights
under the rule of the Islamic republic remains relatively unknown to the outside world as
well as to many Iranians whose knowledge of Kurdistan is limited to state media.
The con ict between state institutions and Kurdish environmental groups in particular reveal competing approaches to economic
development, sustainability and security. Environmental activists denounce the government’s industrial and development policies in
Kurdistan as unsustainable, overly state-centric and detrimental to the natural environment, leaving the Kurdish region even further
underdeveloped and deprived. The state responds to environmental activism as if to a security threat, using harsh measures such as
imprisonment and executions.
 
The Rapid Expansion of Kurdish Civil Society
 
The election victory of reformist clergyman Mohammad Khatami in May 1997 and his two consecutive presidential terms (1997 to 2005),
is often referred to as the moment of the birth of Iran’s contemporary reform movement.[3] Supporting the reformist front at the ballot
box was one of the ways Kurds expressed their support for democratization of the state—speci cally, the de-centralization of power
and greater transparency, meritocracy and rule of law. Many candidates from Kurdish reformist groups were elected to the Iranian
parliament in the sixth election (2000). In the seventh general election in 2004 however, Kurdish reformists, like other reformist groups,
were shut out of parliament when the Guardian Council stepped in to vet, and reject, reformist candidates, which led to a decline in
voter turnout.
Nevertheless, the years of reform improved the political and cultural situation in Kurdistan
to some degree by facilitating the formation of a variety of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and other civil society groups.[4] Since then, Kurdish civil society has entered a new
phase, with various sectors criticizing the state’s policies in Kurdistan. For instance, a
peripheral form of national and cultural identity is seeking to challenge the state’s claim of a
homogeneous and uni ed Iranian identity. This critique is neither new nor unique to the
Kurds: Other non-Persian and non-Shiite communities in Iran also challenge the state’s
formulation of Iranian identity, such as the Azeries, Arabs, Baluch and Turkmens, but it
appears to have accelerated in recent decades, becoming widely popular and politicized.
 
Resistance Through Language and Culture
 
The new civil society organizations bring public attention to domestic violence, criticize the state’s approach to child marriage and child
brides and point out the poor condition of schools and educational institutions in Kurdistan. They also campaign for education in
Iranian schools to be conducted in Kurdish and other languages other than Persian, which is promised by the constitution but was
never instituted. Since the early twentieth century, Kermashan province (particularly its capital city Kermashan) has been at the center
of the state’s linguistic assimilation policies in Kurdistan. Promoting Persian as the only medium of educational instruction has been
deployed by the Islamic republic and its predecessor regimes. The state attempts to enforce this policy through intimidation and
arrests: In July 2020, Zahra Mohammadi, a Kurdish-language teacher in Sanandaj, was arrested and given a ten-year sentence for her
activism. Kurdish resistance to language policy is also not unique to the post-revolution era, as Kurdish manuscripts from the
eighteenth century attest: The legendary Kurdish poet Khana Qubadi (1700-1759) stated in a poem, “even though they say that Persian
is sugar, for me Kurdish is sweeter.”[5]
Student publications in particular have become a platform to denounce the government’s socioeconomic policies in Kurdistan. They
describe state-Kurdish relations in Iran as a center-periphery relationship, where the center not only neglects the rights of Kurds, but
also actively attempts to assimilate Kurds and marginalize their culture and identity.
Student activists also argue that the development and prosperity found in other areas of
Iran has not reached Kurdistan  due to the state’s failed development policies and political
centralism.[6] Their claim challenges the popular slogan, often repeated by certain elites of
the Islamic regime, that “Iran is for all Iranians.”
]Kurdish identity in Iran is being reconstructed through an emphasis on identity and raising
consciousness. For instance, Kurds are commonly referred to by the state as an Aryan
people that shares historical roots with Persians. However, bilingual media produced by Kurdish students has taken a starkly di erent
line over the last two decades. Activists assert that “we have to reclaim our identity and reframe the identity of our land and cities” and
point to the Kurdishness of cities such as Kermashan, the city with the largest Kurdish population in Iran.[7] The promotion of a self-
de ned form of Kurdish identity, distanced from the state-promoted form of Iranian identity (that draws upon Aryanism and Shi’ism) is
a visible element of these publications. Referring to the Kurds as “the people of Zagros,” a terrain with di erent geographical, cultural
and social characteristics to southern, central and eastern Iran, this self-identi cation proclaims the historical di erence between
Kurdish and Persian identity.
 
Environmentalism in the Defense of Kurdistan
 
Environmental activism is another signi cant trend among Kurds in Iran, especially over the last decade: Almost every city in Iranian
Kurdistan now has its own environmental society. The Kurdistan Green Association, Environmental Protectors of Wllat, the Chya Green
Association and the Association of Green Thinkers are examples of environmental NGOs and associations that are campaigning for the
protection and preservation of Kurdistan’s natural environment. Awareness campaigns, such as documenting the destructive impact of
dams, clear-cutting and deforestation, are a major activity of these associations.[8] Criticizing and challenging the state’s industrial and
military projects in Kurdistan and their degrading e ect on nature are further aspects of Kurdish environmentalism.
A core grievance of local Kurdish environmental organizations is the deforestation resulting
from wild res. As documented by Chya Green Association, the Zagros forest su ered from
over 2,100 cases of wild res from 2009 to 2015 in the region of Mariwan. According to
journalist Ammar Goli, these wild res have occurred mainly as result of military drills or the
counter-insurgency tactics of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), since the dense
forests, according to the IRGC, are used for cover by the Peshmerga guerrilla  ghters of the
KDPI, Komala and PJAK. Another core critique surrounds the use of water. When central
parts of Iran, such as Tehran, Isfahan and Kerman, su er from drought and water
shortages, the government—concerned with maintaining economic activities there—transfers water, mainly from Kurdistan’s rivers
and lakes, to those regions. This practice has provoked protest from di erent sections of Kurdish civil society, including environmental
activists.[9]
Local mobilizations against environmentally damaging activities include several peaceful mass demonstrations organized by Chya to
protest the IRGC’s plan to construct an oil re nery next to Lake Zrebar. Chya mobilized up to 15,000 protesters from Mariwan and the
surrounding areas in February 2015 to march from Mariwan toward Zrebar. Due to the substantial size of the protest, the IRGC
cancelled the project, or at least delayed it inde nitely.[10] Chya also organized the Save Kani Bel Campaign in 2016, which involved
3,000 individuals and a host of local NGOs. The protests against the construction of a dam on Kani Bel, a natural spring in Kermashan
province and a symbol of Kurdish identity and culture, included a hunger strike by ten environmental activists.[11] Despite their protest
and campaigns, major elements of the Daryan Dam, constructed on Kani Bel and Sirwan River, were completed in 2018.
The magazine Chya has been an important platform for criticizing the state’s approach to development and sustainability. The
environmental activist, Amin Azizi, reports on government activities such as the construction of dams and oil re neries and demands
that any development in Kurdistan should consider the environment and adopt “a model of environmental security de ned by this
region’s population.”[12]
These tense relations between the politicized and active sections of Kurdish civil society and the Iranian government have further
exacerbated the poor relationship between the state and the Kurds in Iran. The main result is deeper securitization and militarization of
the Kurdish region by the state’s security and judicial institutions.  Some state o cials have also labelled Kurdish environmental
activists as “anti-development” to justify their persecution and imprisonment by the state. For instance, Mariwan’s governor,
Mohammad Kiyani—in reaction to protests by local environmental activists of the authorities’ mismanagement of environmental issues
and pursuit of environmentally degrading development activities in Mariwan—called them the “actions of individuals with political
motives and actions hampering local development.”[13]
The securitization of environmentalism is a countrywide issue and not necessarily limited to the Kurdish region. The mysterious death
of the environmental scientist Kavous Seyed Emami, co-founder of the Persian Wildlife Heritage Foundation, in Evin prison, as well as
the plane crash and deaths of 16 environmentalists  ying from Tehran to Yasuj on February 18, 2017, are examples of the di cult
conditions facing environmental activists across Iran. As shown in recent studies, however, the extent to which the state responds to
activists as a security threat varies by region.[14] Long-term imprisonment, executions and, in some cases, cold-blooded assassinations
of civil society and environmental activists conducted by the IRGC are among the dangers faced by Kurdish civil society.  While there are
few concrete signs of alliances being built across ethnic and regional boundaries at this moment, it is clear that this possibility frightens
the central government and could/should be part of the struggle to build a more democratic Iran and autonomy for Kurds.
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